Committing to Economic Openness and Building Domestic Institutional Capabilities Keywords: Ireland, economic growth, economic development, inward investment, economic systems Creation-Date: 2009 by Teague, Paul
 
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2009 
School of Management and Economics, The Queen’s University Belfast, email: P.Teague@Queens-
Belfast.ac.uk; p.teague@qub.ac.uk 
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on Country Role Models for Development 
Success, directed by Augustin Kwasi Fosu. 
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the project by the Finnish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, and the financial contributions to the research programme by the governments of 
Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Norway 
(Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—
Sida) and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development). 
ISSN 1810-2611   ISBN 978-92-9230-193-4 




Committing to Economic Openness 






This paper sets out to explain the factors behind Ireland’s exceptional period of 
economic growth from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s. It suggests that an unbending 
commitment to economic openness and an on-going effort to establish quality domestic 
institutions were the main drivers of the so-called ‘Celtic tiger’ phenomenon. The 
commitment to economic openness manifested itself in the relentless search for inward 
investment and a willingness to accept deep forms of European integration. Building 
domestic institutional capabilities involved adopting new-classical macroeconomic 
policies, creating a robust system of social partnership and reforming the educational 
system. The two factors positively interacted with each other to create dynamic effects.  
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1  Introduction 
Ireland’s economic performance over the past fifteen years has been nothing short of 
spectacular. During this time, economic growth rates have far exceeded those of other 
EU member states, averaging 10 per cent in the second half of the 1990s. Even more 
impressive has been the job generation record. More than one million jobs have been 
created in the past decade, which has doubled the size of the labour market. This 
economic success is newly found. For most of the twentieth century Ireland was an 
economic laggard relative to other European countries (Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh 
1988). Economic growth rates were consistently unimpressive. Employment generation 
was almost never able to keep pace with new entrants into the labour market, causing 
immigration to be continuously high. The standard of living was poor relative to the 
European average. All in all, Ireland was an underperforming part of Europe: there was 
even talk at the turn of the 1990s of Ireland being a ‘third world’ economy (Caherty 
1992). 
Thus, Ireland has experienced a huge transformation in its economic fortunes within a 
relatively short period of time. In this paper, three main factors are identified as lying 
behind this big transformation. One is the positive benefits that have arisen from placing 
economic openness at the centre of the country’s economic development strategy. 
Another is the creation of high-quality domestic governance structures to manage both 
the economy and society. A third is the concerted effort to upgrade the country’s stock 
of human capital. These three factors are set out in greater detail below. In addition, the 
paper assesses the sustainability of the model of economic development that has been 
created in Ireland and teases out some of the lessons that can be learnt from the Irish 
experience.  
2  Development through economic openness 
What is now known as the Irish Republic gained its independence form Britain in 1921. 
But a bloody civil war over the terms of the settlement meant there was a high level of 
turbulence in Irish politics and society throughout the 1920s (Garvin 1981). A level of 
political stability only returned when Fianna Fail, under the leadership of the Eamon 
DeValera, was returned to government in 1932. This political party, which was to rule 
the country virtually uninterrupted for half a century, introduced an economic 
programme of economic self-sufficiency that sought to decrease dependence on foreign 
imports, primarily from the United Kingdom, and to promote import substituting 
industrialization (O’Grada 1997). The consensus is that this self-sufficiency programme 
was a disaster for the Irish economy, retarding economic growth and industrialization, 
causing employment generation to falter and leading to huge numbers of people 
emigrating from the country in search of a better life elsewhere (Garvin 2004).  
By the mid-1950s, it was accepted by leading civil servants that closing off the Irish 
economy from the outside world had only resulted in a vicious circle of poverty, high 
unemployment and mass emigration (Bew and Patterson 1982). As a result, work started 
within government to overhaul the policies of economic isolation, which culminated in 
the introduction of a new economic development plan in 1958. There were three main 
elements to this new plan: (i) capital grants and tax concessions were provided to 
encourage export-led manufacturing growth; (ii) the country’s newly established 2 
Industrial Development Authority (IDA) was given the task of attracting foreign firms 
to Ireland; and (iii) import levies were gradually to be dismantled so that the country 
could integrate properly into the world economy. The introduction of the plan 
represented a decisive moment in the economic history of the Irish Republic as it 
marked the end of protectionist Ireland and the placement of economic openness at the 
centre of the country’s development model (Lee 1989).  
3  FDI and the Irish economy 
Ireland’s long affair with foreign direct investment (FDI) started in the 1960s and since 
then attracting multinationals has been the backbone of economic development in the 
country. The IDA got very busy enticing multinationals to the country with the sales 
pitch that Ireland had an abundance of young, English-speaking and low-cost labour and 
that any subsidiary established would only have to pay 10 per cent corporation tax on all 
profits from exports. The activity of the IDA amounted to first mover advantage in this 
policy area: no other country was making such a concerted, large-scale effort to attract 
inward investment: the IDA was out there on its own (Ruane 2004). Throughout the 
1960s, FDI grew rapidly in the country: in 1960, foreign firms accounted for 2.3 per 
cent of GNP but this figure had risen to 15.9 per cent by 1973. By the early 1970s, 
multinationals were producing 40 per cent of the country’s industrial output. Many of 
the multinational subsidiaries were either located in low productivity sectors such as 
food and drink or were engaging in relatively routine activities such as the assembly of 
intermediate parts made elsewhere to be sold abroad. Invariably, the skill content and 
added-value potential of these subsidiaries were low, but this was not a major worry to 
the Irish authorities, which viewed the benefits arising from FDI mostly in employment 
terms, compensating for the significant job losses occurring in agriculture (Barry 2004). 
In the 1970s, the IDA made a greater effort to attract higher grade multinational 
subsidiaries. This strategy was successful as there was a significant shift change in the 
sectoral composition of FDI towards engineering, chemicals and pharmaceutical 
industries (Gord and Ruane 1997). Employment in foreign-owned companies increased 
by 23 per cent between 1973-80. Greater awareness emerged amongst policymakers that 
the benefits to be gained from attracting multinationals went beyond employment 
creation as domestic firms could learn about new products, production techniques and 
organizational skills from foreign companies. Efforts to both enlarge the foreign sector 
in the Irish economy and increase its quality continued into the 1980s. Multinationals in 
the electronics and computing sectors started to arrive in sizable numbers during this 
period, including most of the big brand names (O’Rian 2004). This increase, no doubt, 
was helped by the change in fiscal incentives to attract inward investment. Under 
pressure from the European Commission, the Irish government revised the preferential 
corporate tax rate of 10 per cent for foreign-owned companies so that it applied to all 
profits, not simply to those arising from export sales, which made locating in the 
country even more attractive (Buckley and Ruane 2006).  
By the turn of the 1990s, a large foreign-owned sector had emerged in the Irish 
economy. Multinationals were producing about two-thirds of all manufacturing output. 
Whereas employment in domestic manufacturing firms fell by 19 per cent between 1975 
and 1990, it increased by about 27 per cent in the foreign manufacturing sector during 
the same period. Multinationals played an important role in diversifying the Irish 3 
industrial base: many domestic firms were concentrated in low value-added sectors, but 
the arrival of large numbers of pharmaceutical, electronic and software companies from 
abroad significantly increased the size of high-tech sectors in the Irish economy 
(FitzGerald 1999). During the 1990s the FDI sector continued to grow. In 1986 there 
were 650 foreign firms in Ireland, but by 1997 this number had increased to over 1,000. 
Inward investment was occurring mostly in modern high-tech sectors: between 1994 
and 1995 alone these sectors increased by almost 20 per. In one year, 1997, 
manufacturing output grew by 16 per cent, which was primarily attributable to foreign-
owned, high-technology sectors (Sweeney 1998). On top of these developments in the 
manufacturing sector, the International Financial Services Centre created in Dublin by 
the Irish government began attracting significant inward investment in the international 
traded services sector. By 2000, Ireland was receiving 10 per cent of all FDI into the EU 
from outside the EU, even though it accounted for only 1 per cent of the EU population.  
Most inward investment into Ireland is from the USA. At the end of 2000, US firms 
owned assets in Ireland worth US$33.4 billion—equivalent to US$9,000 per person 
living in Ireland at the time. Table 1 breaks down the number of foreign-owned 
multinationals in Ireland by country of origin and by the number of people they employ. 
It clearly shows the huge contribution USA-owned firms make to the Irish economy. All 
in all, the stock of FDI in Ireland now stands at €149 billion, about 30 per cent of GDP. 
These companies generated exports of €73 billion and directly spent €15 billion in 
Ireland in 2005, facts which highlight that the foreign-owned sector has become a 
hugely important part of the Irish economy. The contrast with the late 1950s could 
hardly be greater—the country has moved from protectionist Ireland to global Ireland. 
Clearly a generous regime of fiscal incentives has played a big part in attracting 
multinationals to the country, but the activity of the Industrial Development Agency 
(IDA) has also been important. The IDA is the main state agency responsible for 
attracting multinationals and its work has got progressively more sophisticated since the 
1960s. Forty years ago, FDI was attracted by the blanket offer of generous tax holiday 
incentives. However, policy became more selective in the 1970s. Potential investors 
were identified in high-tech sectors such as electronics and pharmaceuticals and then 
offered higher than normal financial incentives to locate in Ireland. Policy was further 
fine-tuned in the 1980s, becoming less sector-based and more project-based. A more 
systematic approach was taken to selectivity: niche high value-added market segments 
with European growth potential were, first of all, identified; then enterprises which were 
 
Table 1 
FDI in Ireland by country of origin, 2006 
Country of origin  Number of companies 2006  Employment 2006 
US 470  95,515 
Germany 122  10,782 
UK 111  7,356 
Rest of Europe  201  16,504 
Asia Pacific  39  2,991 
Rest of the world  47  2,339 
Total   980  135,487 
Source:   IDA Annual Report 2007. 4 
significant players in the segments were pinpointed, particularly those that might be 
considering opening a new or additional production facilities in Europe; the short-listed 
enterprises would then be contacted to discuss Ireland as a possible investment site; if 
interest was shown, a financial package would be constructed that would be favourable 
for the company, but also advantageous for Ireland. More and more, these financial 
packages are becoming highly customized, resulting in the scale and nature of support 
varying from one project to another. 
This highly flexible, enterprise-focused approach to winning FDI places considerable 
demands on the work of IDA officials. They have to be given considerable discretion so 
that they can deal with potential investors in a creative and customized manner. In many 
ways, these officials act as ‘street-level bureaucrats’, a term first coined in the 1960s to 
describe public officials who enjoy considerable autonomy when carrying out work 
tasks—policemen, teachers, social workers, for example. These workers require 
discretion and autonomy as they work in complex situations that are not conducive to 
the application of prescriptive rules. They often have to make decisions that package 
together multiple objectives in a highly contingent manner (Lipsky 1980). This is 
exactly how IDA officials operate in the field. They have to deal with each potential 
inward investment project differently and display a high level of creativity to construct 
an incentive package that meets the needs of the multinational and delivers benefits for 
Ireland.  
To compensate for the discretion permitted to IDA officials, all proposed financial 
packages are subjected to a careful cost-benefit appraisal to test whether the project will 
deliver value for money. In addition, many of the incentives included in the financial 
package are performance-based and tied to transparent goals and clear reporting 
requirements. These design features allow the financial package to be continuously 
monitored. Thus, the discretionary role of IDA officials is complemented by an internal 
supervening structure that reduces the possibility of bad deals being forged or even 
corruption taking place. It is an internal structure that has worked well so far, given the 
very big presence of FDI in the country.  
4 European  integration   
Commitment to deeper European integration political and economic integration has 
been the second pillar to the policy of economic openness. As soon as Ireland 
abandoned its policy of economic self-sufficiency, joining the Common Market, as the 
EU was known then, was a high economic priority for the government (Laffan 2003). 
But its ambitions on this front were thwarted as its application for membership got 
caught up in the Anglo-French row about the desirability of UK membership of the 
Common Market. Despite being refused membership, the government started to take 
action on the assumption that it would one day gain entry. In particular, it started to 
reduce external tariff barriers, the signing of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement in 
1965 was probably the most significant step taken, to minimize the shock of entering a 
free trade area in Europe. 
Finally, Ireland joined the EU in 1973 and immediately the workings of the custom 
union had an impact on the Irish economy (Blackwell and O’Malley 1984). Trade 
creation and trade diversion are widely considered the two dynamics effects of a 5 
customs union. On the one hand, trade creation effects occur when the removal of tariff 
barriers exposes indigenous industries to more efficient producers in other member 
states. On the other hand, trade diversion occurs when the external tariff barriers that a 
country accepts on joining the EU denies domestic consumers access to producers 
outside the EU which are more efficient than internal producers. Membership of the EU 
released stronger trade creation rather trade diversion effects on the Irish economy. A 
significant number of domestic firms in mature industries were unable to survive in the 
post EU-entry competitive environment (McAleese 2000). In the 1970s and 1980s, 
deeper trade integration with Europe resulted in about 20 per cent of domestically 
owned manufacturing firms going to the wall, which is a fairly sizable restructuring 
(O’Donnell 1991). 
Of course, the shrinkage of the domestic industrial base was more than compensated by 
the arrival of foreign-owned companies (Barry 2006). Entry into the EU strengthened 
the policy of industrialization through inward investment as many multinationals, 
particular those of US origin, regarded Ireland as the ideal geographical location to 
maintain a presence in the European market. Another consequence of the trade creation 
effects of EU membership alongside the increased inward investment was a change in 
Ireland’s trade structure. In 1960, virtually half of Ireland’s imports and exports came 
from or went to the UK. But the combination of inward investment and the opening up 
of new trade relations with the rest of Europe has weakened the British trade 
connection: only around a quarter of Irish exports are now destined for the UK market: 
1921 had brought political independence from the UK, EU membership brought 
economic independence and that played well in policy circles in Dublin. If the trade 
effects of EU membership forced the Irish indigenous manufacturing sector into an 
unwanted restructuring process, the working of the Common Agricultural Policy was 
hugely beneficial to Irish farmers, at least until recently. Even though the Irish 
agricultural sector continued to lose jobs, EU membership brought generous subsidies to 
many farmers, making some of them very prosperous (Matthews 2005).  
Ireland, from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s, benefited from EU structural funds, a 
fiscal redistribution mechanism to help poorer member states and regions catch up with 
the richer parts of Europe and also to assist their preparations for monetary union. 
Between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, these fiscal transfers amounted to about 
2.5-3.0 per cent of Irish GDP. One popular view was that EU structural funds played a 
pivotal role in starting the Irish economic miracle. But the findings of a number of 
careful empirical studies suggest this view is false: in essence, the amount of money 
received from Europe was too small to trigger the Irish boom (Fitzgerald 2004). 
Nevertheless, EU structural funds did positively contribute to the economy, particularly 
by helping to finance a wide range of infrastructural projects. One positive unintended 
consequence from the operation of EU structural funds in Ireland is that it led to big 
improvements in domestic procedures for the evaluation and monitoring of public 
projects. Brussels was insistent that the Irish government introduce best practice 
financial and accounting methods to manage the distribution of EU funds in Ireland. 
When these methods were found to create high standards of programme transparency 
and financial accountability, the Irish government ‘mainstreamed’ the procedures to 
manage all public projects in the country (Fitzgerald 1998). 
But the EU is far more than a trading zone or even an economic union. A powerful 
political mission underpins the working of the EU, pushing the member states ever 
closer together. This mission has had a big impact on the Irish policy elite, who have 6 
been unbridled supporters of deeper political and economic integration in Europe. The 
biggest consequence of this strong commitment was that it shaped a new economic 
policy vision for Ireland. Across political parties, amongst senior policymakers, 
employers and trade unions there is a consensus that Ireland’s economic destiny lies 
with deeper European economic integration. This consensus is virtually unshakeable 
and has led to economic policies being proofed on an on-going basis to assess whether 
or not these advance Irish links with Europe: policies that threaten to dilute the 
European connection are cast to one side (O’Donnell 2002).  
This policy vision has manifested itself in a variety of ways. Virtually all reputable 
macroeconomic models of the Irish economy now work from the assumption that 
Ireland is a region of the European economy: the idea that Ireland is a nation-state with 
a degree of macroeconomic manoeuvrability to influence the demand side of the 
economy has been abandoned by the economic modellers and serious policymakers. It 
is now assumed that the government can really only influence the supply side of the 
economy. In the run-up to entry into the European single currency club, all aspects of 
government economic policies were geared to meeting the Maastricht criteria for 
European Monetary Union (EMU) membership. Inside EMU the country has sought to 
be a credible member of the Eurozone. Thus, the vision of Ireland in a strong Europe 
not only has brought stability and predictability to economic policymaking, but it has 
also created a normative framework to guide the behaviour of all economic actors.  
5  Building domestic macroeconomic stability 
Foreign direct investment alongside European economic integration did much to revamp 
the structure of the Irish economy during the 1970s and 1980s. But one matter it did not 
succeed in doing was help Ireland catch up with average living standards in the EU. In 
1970, Irish GNP per head was roughly 64 per cent of the EU average while in 1990 it 
was 67 per cent. Despite the predictions of economic integration theory that EU 
membership would trigger a catching-up process that would lead to the standard of 
living in poorer member states converging with levels prevailing in the richer member 
states, Ireland remained a European laggard. Convergence only started at the beginning 
of the 1990s with the emergence of the Irish boom. The gap in living standards between 
Ireland and the rest of Europe narrowed rapidly in the 1990s: by 2000 the country’s 
GNP per head was 96 per cent of the EU average. This convergence process has 
continued during the new century to the point where the country now enjoys a living 
standard that is 7 per cent above the EU average: Ireland has become of the richest 
member states of the EU.  
Poor economic management for most of the 1970s and 1980s was the main reason why 
the country failed to catch up with the EU average, which highlights that economic 
openness on its own is unlikely to trigger a process of economic convergence 
(Fitzgerald 1999). Without domestic institutional structures with strong capabilities, a 
country is unlikely to make significant progress towards reaching designated economic 
goals. In the 1970s and 1980s the Irish economy was in a mess (Garvin 2004). 
Difficulties started when the country, like most of Europe, was adversely hit by the big 
oil price increases of the early 1970s. The Irish authorities adopted a naïve Keynesian 
response to this economic shock, spending more or less continuously over the next 
decade to maintain economic growth and employment (MacSharry and White 2000). By 7 
the early 1980s, government debt had reached 14 per cent of GNP. Government finally 
realized that deficit spending was only pushing Ireland further into the economic mire 
and as a result started to take remedial action. Tax rates were increased to 48 per cent 
(in 1973 the rate had been 33 per cent), but the resulting increase in revenue was not 
enough to cover public expenditure. As a result public finances got even worse 
(Sweeney 1998). 
A series of budgets in the early 1980s that promised to stabilize public finances only 
aggravated the mess further. By the middle of the decade, the Irish economy stood at the 
edge of the abyss. Government debt had reached 16 per cent of GNP, inflation was 
running at 15 per cent, unemployment was more than 18 per cent and 30,000 people 
were leaving the country each year in search of a better life elsewhere. In 1987, a new 
government was elected committed to restoring macroeconomic stability. A new 
approach to macroeconomic management was adopted, which is still in operation today 
(see essays in Barry 1999). The content of this new approach has been mostly negative. 
Active fiscal and monetary policies were deemed as not producing large gains because 
governments face balance-of-payments constraints and public finance difficulties. At 
the same time, if limited scope was seen for the use of aggregate demand to improve 
unemployment and the economy more generally, there was also caution about its use 
against inflation. The new consensus can be summed up as thus: maintain pressure on 
inflation but avoid negative shocks to demand.  
Stabilization became the by-word for macroeconomic management. A number of 
institutional changes were made to implement the new stabilization programme. 
Perhaps the most important of these was the creation of a national system of social 
partnership (Teague and Donaghey 2004). When first established the social partnership 
arrangements had two main functions: one was to moderate wage increases and the 
other was to maintain an orderly system of industrial relations. Between 1970 and 1987 
industrial relations in the country had been volatile and unpredictable. National wage 
agreements would be in place for a few years and then they would break down, leading 
to fairly serious increases in industrial strife (Hardiman 1988). All the parties to the new 
social partnership were very determined that it would not fail—there was a real sense 
amongst the parties that the dire economic situation required them to work together. 
Twenty years on and the system of social partnership is still operating. 
The economic contribution made by the national system of social partnership over the 
past two decades is contested. One view, held by mainstream economists, is that social 
partnership and the national social agreements which it produced made only a marginal 
contribution to the Irish boom (McCoy 2006). There is a begrudging recognition that the 
national agreements brought about some stability in industrial relations, but nothing 
much else (Honohan and Walsh 2002). A different interpretation is put forward in this 
paper: social partnership is seen as positively contributing to economic stabilization by 
establishing a regime of wage moderation and by sustaining orderly industrial relations.  
Figure 1 shows that real wages have increased continuously during successive social 
partnership agreements. However, it also reveals that the rate of increase is below the 
rate of productivity increases. Even allowing for such practices as transfer pricing by 
multinationals, which inflate output and hence productivity figures, productivity rates 
have outstripped wage rates during the social partnership era. Thus, while real wages 
were rising, unit labour costs were falling, which had the effect of producing real wage  
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Figure 1 
Productivity and earnings changes, 1987-2006 
 
Source: CSO  Ireland. 
 
depreciation. This not only boosted the economy’s competitiveness, but placed Ireland 
in a healthier economic position to enter and survive in the EMU. Thus, the pay deals 
have accomplished their mission, at least with regard to the private sector, which was to 
moderate wage increases: in all likelihood, pay increases for private sector workers 
would have been higher in absence of the wage agreements.  
The national wage deals operated differently in the public sector. Here, the concern was 
more about securing employment relations stability than with wage moderation. Public 
sector workers are highly unionized and have a much higher propensity to strike. The 
significant industrial relations unrest that occurred in Ireland during the 1970s and early 
1980s was mostly in the public sector (Roche 1992). Thus, under successive 
agreements, public sector workers were able to secure pay increases that they would 
have achieved in the absence of social partnership: social partnership had virtually no 
moderating effect on wage rates in the public sector. The government was able to live 
with this situation as employment relations stability has more or less prevailed in this 
part of the economy.  
Overall, the wage determination system introduced by social partnership successfully 
contributed to macroeconomic stabilization in the country and established the labour 
market conditions for the ‘Celtic tiger’. The wage moderation regime that has been 
maintained under successive agreements has allowed a fall in unit labour costs which is 
extremely important to small open economies, as Katzenstein (1985) first emphasized in 
his seminal book, Small States in World Markets. The regime also signalled to other EU 
member states that Ireland had labour market institutions consistent with monetary 
union. But the social partnership system did more than deliver these economic benefits. 9 
It created a quite deep shared understanding between the government, employers and 
unions that even though they had different, and often competing, interests, it was crucial 
for national prosperity that they collaborate as much as possible with each other. A core 
aspect of this shared understanding was that developing Ireland through economic 
openness required a high level of internal consensus-orientated policymaking on social 
and economic matters. Overall, social partnership has been at the centre of an improved 
system of economic governance that has emerged in Ireland over the past two decades, 
and this institutional change has made a major contribution to recent economic 
prosperity.  
6  Strengthening human capital  
New growth theory suggests that economic development will not progress by only 
active demand management, but also by endogenously determined factors such as 
infrastructure, education and innovation (Aghion and Howitt 1998). Many studies in 
this tradition establish a positive link between human capital and economic 
development: the more skilled and educated a country’s workforce, the more likely it 
will be endowed with the capabilities to permit the rapid diffusion and effective use of 
technological innovations (Krueger and Lindahl 2001). On this view, the design and 
delivery of education has a pivotal role to play in advancing economic development in a 
country. A careful study by O’Grada and O’Rouke (1996) persuasively shows how 
economic growth in the 1950s was held back by Ireland’s poor educational system. The 
massive expansion of education experienced by virtually every north European country 
during the postwar era by-passed Ireland. In the early 1960s, over 50 per of school 
children were leaving school at the age of 13, an appalling figure compared to the rest 
of Europe. It was not until 1967 that free secondary level education was introduced. 
Since the late 1960s, successive governments have maintained high levels of investment 
in education. Even during the bleak years of the 1980s, funding for education was 
maintained: nearly every other area of public expenditure was cut back. As a result of 
this new commitment, Ireland’s educational performance has caught up with the rest of 
Europe. Participation at all levels of education has increased dramatically in the past 
thirty years. The proportion of the labourforce in the 54-65 age-category, those who 
would have entered the labour market sometime in the 1970s, with at least upper 
secondary education was 38 per cent in 2005, while the same figure for those in the  
25-30 age-category, those entering the labour market sometime in the past 10-15 years, 
was 78 per cent. About 58 per cent of school students are now staying on to do some 
form of third level education—an increase of a factor of six during the past thirty years 
(OECD 2007). The proportion of the 25-34 year-old cohort in the labourforce with 
tertiary level education is now above the OECD average. Ireland has belatedly 
experienced the educational revolution that occurred in other European countries in the 
1950s.  
A distinctive feature of the Irish educational system has been the rapid expansion of 
third-level provision, mainly in the form of enlarging the role of institutes of 
technology, formerly known as the regional technical colleges. In the 1960s students 
going to these institutes constituted less than a quarter of all third-level students, 
however they now constitute about half of the total. Enlarging the role of the institutes 
of technology resulted in a big rise in the number of third-level graduates with technical 10 
and scientific qualifications. One report suggests that Ireland has the highest number of 
science and engineering graduates amongst the 25-34 year-old labour-market cohort in 
the world (see Barry 2007). Another feature of the institutes is that they offer curricula 
that are more practical and more sensitive to the needs of business, which was exactly 
what the country wanted just at a time when multinationals were arriving in large 
numbers. 
Ireland is a small country which enables one arm of government to work closely with 
another arm. There have been close and on-going interactions between the higher 
educational sector and the economic development agencies during the last 3-4 decades. 
In the late 1970s, for example, the IDA and Forfas pressed third-level education 
institutes, both universities and the institutes of technology, to produce more computing 
and electronic engineering graduates. The result was a near tenfold increase in computer 
science graduates in five years (White 2001). This high level of engagement continues 
today. Currently, there is a debate about whether the policy of producing large numbers 
of intermediate level technical graduates, which served the country well during the past 
two decades, has run its course. The argument is that to compete in the new knowledge-
based economy requires the country to create a sophisticated national system of 
innovation, part of which will involve more research oriented, higher grade graduates. 
There has been no conclusion to this debate, but the universities are already ratcheting 
up their postgraduate provision in anticipation that they will be asked to help deepen the 
educational attainment of people even further.  
Undoubtedly, the transformation of the education system has had a positive impact on 
the stock of human capital in the country. Working out how improvements in the 
educational system influence economic performance is difficult. The most reliable, 
though at the same time conservative, calculations estimate that rising educational 
attainment has contributed about 1 per cent annually to economic growth during the past 
two decades (Fitzgerald 1999). Another trend is that returns to education have increased 
significantly during the last 20 years; in other words, graduates are now being better 
paid than ever before for having qualifications. All in all, the Irish educational system 
has been massively transformed in the past 30 years and is now producing highly 
qualified people that can be rapidly integrated into the labour market. There is a wide 
consensus in the literature that this has been a contributing factor behind the Irish boom 
(Barry 2007). 
7  The sustainability of Ireland’s development strategy 
A lively, on-gong debate exists about the merits and sustainability of the Irish economic 
development model. One critical view is that the strategy of economic openness, which 
has been pursued by successive Irish governments without compromise, has turned 
Ireland into an entrepôt economy: a place which multinationals use mostly to assemble 
things to be sold in other countries (O’Hearn 1998). On this view, the strategy of 
developing the economy through attracting FDI has crowded out the ability of the 
indigenous part of the Irish economy to grow and to engage in higher value-added 
business activity. One variant of this argument suggests that the Celtic tiger was 
primarily caused by the American boom in the 1990s: USA companies used excess 
profits to establish subsidiaries in Ireland (Allen 2000). Those who hold this view 
invariably point to Scandinavian countries, which have been successful in acquiring a 11 
high standard of living by building up dynamic indigenous business sectors, as the 
development path that should have been adopted for Ireland (see Coulter and Coleman 
2003).  
There is no doubt that the extreme economic openness of the Irish economy has its 
down side, particularly in terms of making the country highly vulnerable to external 
economic shocks (Lane and Ruane 2006). On this point, there is wide agreement. But, 
the claim that economic openness has turned Ireland into a warehouse economy is too 
strong and can be challenged on a number of fronts. First of all, this view tends to 
understate the policy options that were realistically open to Irish policymakers 50 years 
ago in their endeavours to improve economic performance. In the 1950s, Ireland faced 
the classical development trap of late industrializing countries. On the one hand, it 
sought to leapfrog the experiences of already industrialized countries and diffuse   
state-of-the-art technologies and production methods to create a dynamic indigenous 
industrial sector. On the other hand, existing industries did not have the knowhow or the 
capabilities to absorb advance technologies. In the prevailing conditions of 1950s 
Ireland trying to turn around the country’s poor economic performance by attracting 
inward investment was probably a more viable policy option than many (Krugman 
1997).  
A second criticism is that the entrepôt  economy understates the benefits that have 
accrued to the Irish economy from inward investment. A range of studies have shown 
that multinationals make a net positive fiscal contribution to the Irish exchequer (see 
Buckley and Ruane 2006). Moreover, multinationals have created highly skilled 
technical and professional jobs that may not have been available otherwise, with the 
effect of allowing some of the best educated young people to remain in Ireland rather 
than leave for career opportunities elsewhere. FDI has led to the diffusion within Ireland 
of advanced technological innovations and production methods as well as state-of-the-
art organizational and managerial practices: multinationals have helped upgrade the 
Irish business environment.  
A third criticism is that the entrepôt  economy thesis underestimates the degree of 
change that has occurred in the Irish indigenously-owned sector. A number of studies 
have pointed out that a leading edge, globally competitive local software industry has 
emerged in Ireland that has only tenuous links with software multinationals located in 
the country (see O’Rian 2004; O’Gorman, O’Malley and Mooney 1997). Local software 
companies employ as many people as the subsidiaries of software multinational 
companies. In addition, a local financial and business service sector, which is 
internationally oriented, has grown rapidly during the past decade, mainly as a result of 
the emergence of the Irish Financial Services Centre. The level of outward investment 
by Irish companies has boomed in recent years, increasing by 325 per cent between 
2001 and 2005. In 2005 Irish outward FDI was valued at €118 billion. Manufacturing is 
the most common activity by subsidiaries of Irish companies, making up 26 per cent of 
the total: business services come next with 21 per cent. The pace of the increase in 
outward investment flows has been such that it now exceeds inward investment flows of 
overseas companies in Ireland (Forfas 2007). Thus, the important changes that have 
been occurring in the indigenous sector during the past few decades fit uneasily with the 
entrepôt view of the Irish economy.  
Overall, the argument that Ireland has allowed itself to be turned into an entrepôt 
economy is a lopsided and partial account of how the country has developed over the 12 
past 40-50 years. At the same time, it must be recognized that the country faces some 
stern challenges in forthcoming years. During the past 15 years, the spectacular 
performance of the Irish economy suggests that it has been able to withstand the big 
pressures that arise from economic openness. As a result, the country has caught up 
with, and in some instance overtaken, the standard of living of other advanced 
economies. But this catch-up process has unavoidable consequences. In particular, as 
the economy has caught up, so its price and cost-base have increased. Ireland has 
become a fully paid up member of the club of rich nations. This poses problems. One is 
that it becomes more difficult to attract inward investment: the cost/skill mix in other 
countries currently riding the catching-up wave is as attractive, if not more so, to 
multinationals as Ireland’s. The other problem is offshoring: the migration of firms and 
jobs out of Ireland. There has been no close study of the extent to which offshoring is 
occurring in Ireland, but there is widespread acceptance that it has been happening and, 
if anything, is gathering momentum.  
In a nutshell, as Ireland has prospered so the competitive challenge of maintaining, let 
alone increasing, current standards of living has intensified. Policymakers are acutely 
aware of this problem and a concerted effort has begun to upgrade economic and 
industrial policies. The IDA, for instance, is now less interested in attracting 
multinationals in the electronics and computing sectors and more eager to secure FDI in 
the growing bio-technology related industries. New policy incentives and programmes 
are being developed to make Ireland an attractive location for international bio-
technology companies. In addition, a new agency called Science Foundation Ireland has 
been established to improve primary research in the universities and to deepen R&D 
and other innovation activity in the commercial sector. Current policy activities are 
nothing less than a bold attempt to re-orientate the economy towards knowledge and 
innovation. Every effort is being made to ensure that the country maintains its newly 
found prosperity. 
7  Conclusions: learning from Ireland  
The Irish economy has been transformed during the past 30 years. A range of factors are 
responsible for this transformation, which has left the country a prosperous and dynamic 
place. Several lessons can be drawn from the Irish experience. One is that policy 
elites—the state, if you like—in a country need to forge an economic development 
policy vision, not only to guide government interventions, but also to create a 
framework of understanding that will foster national awareness and buy-in into the 
development model (Chang and Rowthorn 1995). In Ireland there has been unwavering 
support for the economic openness programme to the extent that there is deep suspicion 
of any political party or proposed public policy that might compromise the global 
Ireland brand. But it is not sufficient to only have a widely accepted economic vision; 
policymakers also need to be pragmatic. As Dani Rodrik (2008) persuasively argues, 
very often policymaking in developing countries is about constructing second-best 
solutions to problems: first-best solutions are invariably out of the reach of 
policymakers. In Ireland, policymakers had to be pragmatic continuously when trying to 
stabilize the economy or hold together the national social partnership arrangement. One 
of the impressive features of Irish policymaking process is how it combines vision and 
pragmatism.  13 
A second lesson from the Irish experience is the importance of building high quality 
institutions and institutional arrangements. The IDA is a first-rate economic 
development agency that continuously delivers on its mission to bring high-quality 
inward investment to Ireland in a way that benefits the country. The social partnership 
regime has not brought social democracy to Ireland, but it has created an orderly wage 
determination system and sustained industrial relations stability (O’Donnell and 
O’Reardan 2000). As a result, it not only helped pull the county back from the 
economic abyss, but it also has advanced the core economic objective of making Ireland 
an attractive place for inward investment. These institutional arrangements have been 
efficient in the functional sense as they have successfully performed the tasks they were 
set up to do. But they have also operated in a cultural way, embedding values and 
beliefs about the positive benefits that arise from economic openness for Ireland.  
A third lesson from the Irish experience is the importance of policy consistency. Since 
the adoption of the policy of economic openness in the late 1950s, every effort has been 
made to ensure that all other economic and social policies are consistent with this goal. 
For instance, the government has resolutely ensured that the social partnership 
arrangement did not produce employment relations policies on trade union recognition 
or employee participation that might tarnish Ireland’s attractiveness as a site for inward 
investment. Frequently, Irish governments have lined up with British governments to 
block the passage of EU social policies, a tactic deliberately adopted to signal to 
multinationals that Ireland is a good place for business. This idea of policy consistency 
should not be confused with the notion of policy complementary that is found in the 
political economy literature on ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Soskice and Hall 2001). Policy 
complementary is about different institutions and policy programme positively 
interacting with each other in a mutually reinforcing manner to produce dynamic gains. 
Nothing as intricate as this has emerged in Ireland: the emphasis has been on putting in 
place policies that are consistent with the core policy vision of economic openness.  
A fourth lesson, which gives support to Hirschman’s (1958) metaphor of development 
as a jigsaw puzzle, is that Irish policymakers have increasingly contextualized 
policymaking and have also become acutely aware that priority setting is crucially 
important. Ireland, in the 1970s, mimicked the response of other bigger countries to the 
oil price shocks and implemented Keynesianism demand management policies. But this 
approach had huge negative consequences for the economy. The lesson learnt from this 
experience was that the crude imitation of policies developed in other countries does not 
work: policies and programmes have to be moulded so they are in line with actual 
existing domestic conditions. Similarly, there is a growing recognition that everything 
cannot be done at once. As the Celtic tiger started to get into full swing, demands 
increased for the country to build a Scandinavian type welfare state. But these calls 
were resisted by the policy elite who were partly concerned about the fiscal implications 
of such a course of action and partly concerned that it would disrupt the workings of 
social partnership arrangements. In other words, the proposal was considered a step too 
far. Thus, the Irish experience suggests that international bandwagons should be treated 
with caution and the focus should be on addressing the most pressing domestic 
economic problems and constraints. Problem-solving and social learning are the by-
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